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A JURY OF WHOSE PEERS?: ELIMINATING 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY 
SELECTION PROCEDURES 
Hilary Weddell* 
Abstract: The jury system is intended to instill fairness and increase con-
fidence in the American legal system as a whole. Despite this goal, wide-
spread discrimination remains in jury selection procedures. In order to 
adequately protect both a defendant’s right to be tried by a jury of his 
peers and every citizen’s right to participate in the legal system, represen-
tativeness should be improved at each of three levels where juror exclu-
sion takes place: (1) the assembly of the jury pool; (2) the issuance of ex-
emptions and excusals from jury service; and (3) the use of peremptory 
challenges in empanelling the petit jury. States should institute a system 
like the one used in Massachusetts, which limits service to one day or one 
trial and eliminates all exemptions from jury service. In addition, the Su-
preme Court should reevaluate the current unfettered use of peremptory 
challenges. 
Introduction 
 It was an unfortunate case of being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time for the “Scottsboro Boys” on a chilly Spring morning in 
1931.1 Nine young African American boys were “hoboing” their way 
across rural Alabama on a freight train when a group of boys con-
fronted them exclaiming “[t]his is a white man’s train. All you Nigger 
bastards unload.”2 The ensuing brawl between the two groups was re-
ported to the local Sheriff, who ordered the immediate deputization of 
all available gun-owning men to “capture every negro on the train and 
bring them to Scottsboro.”3 When the train stopped at Paint Rock sta-
                                                                                                                      
 
* Editor in Chief, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2013). I 
would like to thank my parents and my husband for their love, support, and encouragement. 
1 See Stephan Landsman, History’s Stories: Stories of Scottsboro, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1739, 
1739 (1995). 
2 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932); Scottsboro: An American Tragedy (PBS 
2001). The Scottsboro Boys’ ages ranged from thirteen to twenty. N. Jeremi Duru, The Central 
Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1315, 
1334 (2004). Before this unfortunate day that would forever change their lives, many of the 
boys had never met. See id. 
3 Powell, 287 U.S. at 50–51; Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the Ameri-
can South 5 (2007); Landsman, supra note 1, at 1739; Douglas O. Linder, Without Fear or 
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tion later that afternoon, a posse of armed men rushed onboard and 
captured the young Scottsboro Boys within minutes.4 What the posse 
did not expect to find, however, were two young white girls who had 
also been free riding on the open carts of the freight train.5 
 Not until twenty minutes later, when the girls were being taken 
into custody for their free riding and were directly asked whether they 
were bothered by the Scottsboro Boys, did Ruby Bates claim that she 
and her friend, Victoria Price, had been raped.6 The girls claimed that 
they were held down at knifepoint while the nine Scottsboro Boys took 
turns raping them.7 All nine of the boys were immediately taken to 
Scottsboro where an angry mob was eagerly awaiting their arrival, al-
ready convinced of the boys’ guilt.8 Six days later the boys were ar-
raigned for the alleged rapes, and each of them plead not guilty.9 The 
boys were never given an opportunity to communicate with their fami-
lies or obtain competent legal counsel of their own choice.10 
                                                                                                                      
 
Favor: Judge James Edwin Horton and the Trial of the “Scottsboro Boys,” 68 UMKC L. Rev. 549, 
550 (2000); Scottsboro: An American Tragedy, supra note 2. 
4 Carter, supra note 3, at 5; Linder, supra note 3, at 550; see Landsman, supra note 1, at 
1739. 
5 Carter, supra note 3, at 5; see Landsman, supra note 1, at 1739. Ruby Bates was seven-
teen years old. Hollace Ransdell, American Civil Liberties Union, Report on the 
Scottsboro, Ala. Case 2 (1931), available at http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ 
FTrials/scottsboro/Scottsbororeport.pdf (last visited May 16, 2013). Victoria Price’s age at 
the time of the alleged incident is unclear although townspeople reported her age as be-
tween nineteen and twenty-one. Id. at 16. 
6 See Linder, supra note 3, at 550–51. 
7 James R. Acker, Scottsboro and Its Legacy: The Cases that Challenged Ameri-
can Legal and Social Justice 8 (2008); Carter, supra note 3, at 14. 
8 Powell, 287 U.S. at 51 (stating the “attitude of the community was one of great hostil-
ity”); Carter, supra note 3, at 8; Linder, supra note 3, at 551; see Duru, supra note 2, at 1335. 
9 Powell, 287 U.S. at 49, 52; Acker, supra note 7, at 5; Landsman, supra note 1, at 1739; 
Scottsboro Timeline, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/scottsboro/timeline/index.html 
(last visited May 16, 2013) [hereinafter Scottsboro Timeline]. The girls’ identification of the 
Scottsboro Boys as their attackers at the jailhouse line-up was highly suspect. See Linder, 
supra note 3, at 551. The attention seeking, quick witted Price identified six of the Scotts-
boro Boys who had allegedly raped her, while Bates just stood silently. Id. The guard as-
sumed that “[i]f those six had Miss Price, it stands to reason that the others had Miss 
Bates.” Id. 
10 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 52–53. Defense counsel was not appointed until the morning 
of the first trial and had no knowledge of the case or of procedure in Alabama. Id. at 57–
58. Throughout the trials, Price, the prosecution’s star witness, played to the sentiment of 
the courtroom, giving what was expected of her: a convincing story without hesitations 
that might “slow up the death sentences.” See Ransdell, supra note 5, at 5, 16. Because 
Price gave exactly the story she knew most white southerners expected to hear, few noticed 
that her testimony was riddled with inconsistencies. See Ransdell, supra note 5, at 11 (ex-
plaining that Price and Bates’s testimony “fitted together so badly as to indicate that they 
were deliberately giving untruthful evidence”); Duru, supra note 2, at 1337. In contrast, 
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  In the span of four days, the boys were tried in four separate 
cases.11 By April 9, 1931, just two weeks after that fateful train ride across 
rural Alabama, eight of the nine Scottsboro Boys were sentenced to 
death by all-white juries.12 The ninth boy, thirteen year-old Roy Wright, 
narrowly escaped the death penalty when the jury could not agree 
whether to impose death or life imprisonment, resulting in a hung 
jury.13 The nine young boys, many of whom met for the first time on the 
train, would spend the rest of their lives fighting for their freedom.14 
 In the days after the pronouncement of the Scottsboro Boys’ death 
sentences, word of the “legal lynching” suffered by these boys spread 
across the country.15 Despite the resulting public outcry for justice, on 
March 24, 1932, just one day shy of the one year mark of the train ride 
that forever changed their lives, the Supreme Court of Alabama af-
firmed the convictions of all but one of the Scottsboro Boys.16 Only 
Eugene Williams was granted a new trial because he was thirteen years 
old and thus subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.17 
 Continuing their fight for freedom, the Scottsboro Boys appealed 
once again, this time to the United States Supreme Court.18 On No-
vember 7, 1932, the Court overturned the boys’ convictions in a seven-
to-two decision, finding that the boys were denied due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment because they were not adequately repre-
sented at trial.19 The Scottsboro Boys were all granted new trials in the 
Alabama state courts.20 
                                                                                                                      
 
Bates, the other alleged victim, was dubbed by many as “slow and stupid” because she was 
unable to make her testimony fit with the testimony given by Price on the stand and could 
not positively identify her alleged attackers. Ransdell, supra note 5, at 6, 16. 
11 Ransdell, supra note 5, at 5; Scottsboro Timeline, supra note 9. 
12 Scottsboro: An American Tragedy, supra note 2. As the judge read the first guilty 
verdict sentencing Clarence Norris to death by electrocution, the courtroom erupted in 
cheers. Ransdell, supra note 5, at 5, 7–8. 
13 Landsman, supra note 1, at 1740; Linder, supra note 3, at 552–53. Notwithstanding 
the prosecution’s request for life imprisonment because of the child’s “tender age,” eleven 
of the twelve jurors held out for the death sentence. Landsman, supra note 1, at 1740; 
Linder, supra note 3, at 552–53. Roy Wright spent the following six years in jail awaiting 
retrial before the charges against him were dropped in 1937. Douglas O. Linder, Biogra-
phies of Key Figures in “The Scottsboro Boys” Trials, UMKC Sch. L., http://law2.umkc.edu/ 
faculty/projects/FTrials/scottsboro/SB_biog.html (last visited May 16, 2013). 
14 See Duru, supra note 2, at 1334. 
15 See Acker, supra note 7, at 35–36; Ransdell, supra note 5, at 8. 
16 See Carter, supra note 3, at 158; Ransdell, supra note 5, at 9. 
17 Carter, supra note 3, at 158. 
18 Powell, 287 U.S. at 49–50. 
19 Id. at 45, 71, 73, 77. This was the first time that the Supreme Court recognized that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to poor criminal defen-
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 Following a change of venue, the second round of trials for the 
Scottsboro Boys took place in Decatur, Alabama.21 Despite what ap-
peared to be powerful exculpatory testimony—including Bates’s testi-
mony for the defense that she and Price lied about the alleged rapes— 
three of the Scottsboro Boys were again found guilty and sentenced to 
death by all-white juries.22 
 The defendants again appealed to the Supreme Court, this time 
claiming that they were denied equal protection of the laws under the 
Fourteenth Amendment due to the “long-continued, systematic, and 
arbitrary exclusion of qualified negro citizens from service on juries, 
solely because of their race and color . . . .”23 In a unanimous decision, 
the Supreme Court agreed with the defense and again saved the 
Scottsboro Boys from the electric chair.24 The Supreme Court noted 
that although there was evidence of a substantial number of African 
American citizens who were eligible for jury service in the county 
where the trials were held, no African American had ever served.25 The 
Supreme Court’s 1934 ruling in Norris v. Alabama did not just impact 
                                                                                                                      
dants in state courts, guaranteeing them competent counsel appointed on their behalf. See 
id. 
20 Id. at 73. 
21 Landsman, supra note 1, at 1740. 
22 Carter, supra note 3, at 239; James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro 134 (1994); 
Landsman, supra note 1, at 1741; Scottsboro: An American Tragedy, supra note 2. 
Bates, who was missing in the weeks leading up to the trial, appeared at the close of trial, 
confessing that her conscience had gotten the best of her. Carter, supra note 3, at 231–33; 
Goodman, supra, at 131–32; Scottsboro: An American Tragedy, supra note 2. She testi-
fied that both she and Price had lied about the alleged rapes. See Goodman, supra, at 132. 
23 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 588 (1934). 
24 Id. at 599. 
25 Id. at 591–92. The State of Alabama set forth the following eligibility requirements 
for jurors: 
The jury commission shall place on the jury roll and in the jury box the 
names of all male citizens of the county who are generally reputed to be hon-
est and intelligent men, and are esteemed in the community for their integ-
rity, good character and sound judgment, but no person must be selected 
who is under twenty-one or over sixty-five years of age, or, who is an habitual 
drunkard, or who, being afflicted with a permanent disease or physical weak-
ness is unfit to discharge the duties of a juror, or who cannot read English, or 
who has ever been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. If a 
person cannot read English and has all the other qualifications prescribed 
herein and is a freeholder or householder, his name may be placed on the 
jury roll and in the jury box. 
Id. at 590–91 (quoting 1931 Ala. Acts, 59). 
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the hotly contested Scottsboro trials; it served as a basis for the integra-
tion of many Southern courtrooms for decades to come.26 
 Amid national scrutiny, the Scottsboro Boys were once again tried 
before Judge Callahan in Decatur.27 Haywood Patterson, now being 
tried for the fourth time, was again convicted, this time receiving a sen-
tence of seventy-five years imprisonment.28 Three more of the Scotts-
boro Boys were tried and again convicted.29 Then, on July 24, 1937, in a 
shocking turn of events, the State of Alabama dropped the charges 
against the other four defendants, who had already spent six years in 
jail.30 The State explained that they were releasing these boys because 
at the time of the incident one of the boys was practically blind and an-
other one suffered from a serious venereal disease that would have 
made it excruciatingly painful to commit the crime.31 The other two 
defendants were said to be released because at the time of the crime 
they were only twelve and thirteen years old, and after six and a half 
years in jail, the “ends of justice” would not be met by further prosecu-
tion.32 
 Not until 1950, almost twenty years after that fateful train ride, was 
the last of the Scottsboro Boys released on parole by the State of Ala-
bama.33 After eleven jury trials and two favorable decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court, the Scottsboro Boys spent a combined 
total of 104 years in prison for a crime they did not commit.34 
 The plight of the Scottsboro Boys is nothing short of a legal trav-
esty.35 The boys’ trials were a guise; the citizens of Alabama had con-
demned them to death upon hearing the accusations against them.36 
Racial prejudices were rampant in the courtroom, where many of the 
judges clearly favored the prosecution and disparaged the defense 
                                                                                                                      
26 Id. at 599; see Scottsboro: An American Tragedy, supra note 2. 
27 Landsman, supra note 1, at 1742. 
28 Id.; Scottsboro Timeline, supra note 9. 
29 Landsman, supra note 1, at 1742; Scottsboro: An American Tragedy, supra note 
2. Clarence Norris was again convicted and sentenced to death. Carter, supra note 3, at 
369–70. Andy Wright was again convicted and sentenced to ninety-nine years imprison-
ment. Id. at 372–73. Charlie Weems was again convicted and sentenced to seventy-five years 
imprisonment. Id. at 375. 
30 Landsman, supra note 1, at 1742; Scottsboro: An American Tragedy, supra note 
2; Scottsboro Timeline, supra note 9. 
31 Associated Press, Prosecutors’ Statement: The Explanation of the Freeing of Four Defendants, 
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1937, at 4. 
32 Id. 
33 Duru, supra note 2, at 1337; Landsman, supra note 1, at 1742. 
34 Duru, supra note 2, at 1337; Landsman, supra note 1, at 1742. 
35 Duru, supra note 2, at 1337. 
36 Ransdell, supra note 5, at 18. 
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counsel in front of the jury.37 Jury selection procedures in the case 
were also a sham as the courts continually excluded African Ameri-
cans from the panel, but included whites who openly admitted that 
they regarded African Americans as an “inferior race.”38 
  The Scottsboro Boys’ story highlights the struggle of African 
Americans to secure the basic rights afforded to all by the Constitution; 
a struggle that continues today.39 Now, more than eighty years later, we 
pride ourselves on the progress we have made, yet often forget that 
much remains to be done.40 
 Some of the most shocking evidence of racial discrimination in the 
twenty-first century can be seen in the jury selection process.41 Efforts 
have been made to increase jury representativeness, however, that goal 
has yet to be fully realized.42 For example, in a series of decisions in the 
1970s, the Supreme Court mandated that jury venires—the pool of 
prospective jurors from which jurors are selected—represent a “fair 
cross section of the community.”43 Although more African Americans 
appeared in jury venires following these decisions, this achievement was 
quickly undercut through the proliferation of discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges.44 
 In a June 2010 report, the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI) studied jury 
selection procedures in eight southern states and uncovered wide-
spread discrimination that posed a serious threat to the “credibility and 
reliability of the criminal justice system.”45 The EJI study found that 
prosecutors in Houston County, Alabama, have used peremptory chal-
lenges to remove from jury service eighty percent of qualified African 
                                                                                                                      
37 Duru, supra note 2, at 1337–38. 
38 Id. 
39 See Landsman, supra note 1, at 1743. 
40 See Equal Justice Initiative, Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: 
A Continuing Legacy 11–14 (2010) [hereinafter EJI Report]. 
41 See id. at 4. 
42 See id. at 11–14. 
43 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 370 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 
537–38 (1975) (finding Louisiana’s jury selection procedures, which excluded women 
from service unless they had previously filed a declaration opting in, violated the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of a jury drawn from a pool representative of the community); see 
also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306–07 (1879) (finding exclusions from jury 
service based on race violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), 
abrogated on other grounds by, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
44 See EJI Report, supra note 40, at 11–14. 
45 Id. at 2, 4. The following eight states’ jury selection procedures were examined by 
the Equal Justice Initiative: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
South Carolina, and Tennessee. Id. at 4. 
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Americans.46 The study likewise found that in felony cases in Jefferson 
Parish, Louisiana, prosecutors are three times more likely to strike Afri-
can American jurors than white jurors.47 
 Although procedures are in place whereby one can object to the 
discriminatory removal of minorities from the jury pool, these proce-
dures have proven ineffective.48 After a defendant raises a claim that 
the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges discriminatorily, the 
prosecutor is given an opportunity to offer a “race-neutral” explanation 
for the strike.49 The Supreme Court has articulated that this is a low 
burden and that the reason offered “need not be plausible, let alone 
persuasive.”50 As a result, courts have accepted “race-neutral” dismissals 
of African American potential jurors for reasons such as: alleged lack of 
intelligence or low education; living in an area with a high crime rate; 
“look[ing] like a drug dealer;” chewing gum; wearing sunglasses in 
court; or having a child out of wedlock.51 Because almost any proffered 
explanation is accepted, the procedure does little to eliminate racial 
discrimination from jury selection procedures; consequently, minorities 
continue to be denied their constitutional right to sit on juries at alarm-
ingly high rates.52 
 This Note will examine the concept of a trial by a “jury of one’s 
peers” throughout American history. Part I examines the development 
of the jury trial and shows how the interpretation of “peers” has evolved 
from its original appearance in the Magna Carta to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation today of a “fair cross-section of the community.” Part II 
examines how the fair cross-section guarantee applies to selection pro-
cedures for the initial jury pool. Part II also examines the impact of ex-
cusals and exemptions from jury service on the representativeness of 
the jury. Part III studies the selection of the petit jury and the use of dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges. Finally, Part IV argues that the pro-
cedures utilized to seat a jury seriously diminish the Supreme Court’s 
guarantee of an impartial jury representing a “fair cross-section of the 
community.” In response to this problem, Part IV articulates ways that 
representativeness can be improved at each of three levels where juror 
exclusion takes place: (1) the initial drawing of the jury pool; (2) ex-
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. at 14. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 14–16. 
49 Id. at 15. 
50 EJI Report, supra note 40, at 15. 
51 Id. at 17–18. 
52 Id. at 14, 17–18. 
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emptions and excusals from jury service; and (3) the use of peremptory 
challenges in empanelling the petit jury. This Note will focus both on a 
defendant’s right to be tried by a fair cross-section of the community 
and on every citizen’s right to participate in the legal system. 
I. What Is a “Jury of One’s Peers”? 
 The common law principle of a jury of one’s peers has existed for 
centuries and even appears in Article 39 of the Magna Carta, which 
states that “[n]o freeman shall be captured or imprisoned or disseised 
or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go against him 
or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by 
the law of the land.”53 Although the word “peer” does not appear in the 
United States Constitution, the Sixth Amendment’s mandate of trial by 
“an impartial jury” has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to re-
quire a trial by a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.54 
 The right to a trial by jury is of great import in the American legal 
system.55 Its participatory nature is rooted in the concept of democracy, 
and as such it aspires to protect individual liberty.56 The jury trial has 
been praised as “the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a 
government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”57 It is a 
symbol of both democracy at its best and democracy at its worst.58 
                                                                                                                      
53 Daniel R. Coquillette, The Anglo-American Legal Heritage: Introductory 
Materials 85, 160–62 (2d ed. 2004). 
54 U.S. Const. amend. VI; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537–38 (1975); Valerie P. 
Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 49 (2001). 
55 See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 31; 1 American Bar Association Division 
for Public Education, Part 1: The History of Trial by Jury, in Dialogue on the American 
Jury: We the People in Action 1, 1 (2005), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/jury/moreinfo/dialoguepart1.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ABA Jury History]. Outside the United States, the civil jury trial is rarely used. Hans & 
Vidmar, supra note 54, at 31. In fact, the United States accounts for around eighty percent 
of all jury trials worldwide. Id. 
56 See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 36; ABA Jury History, supra note 55, at 1. The 
importance of a trial by jury was expressed by Thomas Jefferson when he wrote: “[w]ere I 
called upon to decide, whether the people had best be omitted in the legislative or judiciary 
department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the legislative. The execution of the 
laws is more important than the making of them.” Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 36. 
57 ABA Jury History, supra note 55, at 1. 
58 Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy 
1 (1994); Kenneth W. Starr, Juries and Justice, in 9 The Gauer Distinguished Lecture in 
Law and Public Policy 9, 9 (2000). 
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A. Historical Evolution of Trial by Jury 
 The concept of a trial by jury stems from English common law and 
dates back as far as King Henry II’s “self-informing juries” of the twelfth 
century.59 A “self-informing jury” is one that is formed from members 
of the community who are familiar with the parties and have personal 
knowledge of the dispute.60 The “self-informing jury” therefore makes 
its decision without the presentation of evidence.61 
 Brought to America by the English colonists, the right to a jury 
trial was present in every colony as a symbol of freedom and a protec-
tion against oppression.62 The colonies used juries to resist England’s 
unpopular laws.63 In the eighteenth century juries were comprised of 
members of the defendant’s community because local residents were 
presumed to have the most thorough knowledge of the neighborhood, 
social norms, the parties themselves, and the facts surrounding the dis-
pute.64 Whereas in the eighteenth century jurors who knew the parties 
and the dispute were sought out, in the twenty-first century informed 
jurors are kept off juries because of a belief that they may be unfairly 
biased.65 This belief stems from the notion that jurors have a tendency 
to interpret evidence based on their underlying values and opinions; as 
humans, they tend to “see what [they] want to see.”66 
                                                                                                                      
59 Leonard W. Levy, The Palladium of Justice 11–13 (1999); James Oldham, Trial 
by Jury: The Seventh Amendment and Anglo-American Special Juries 115 (2006); 
Starr, supra note 58, at 18; ABA Jury History, supra note 55, at 1. 
60 Randolph N. Jonakait, The American Jury System 107 (2003); Oldham, supra 
note 59, at 115. 
61 Jonakait, supra note 60, at 107; Oldham, supra note 59, at 115. 
62 See Jonakait, supra note 60, at 21; Starr, supra note 58, at 16, 31. Prior to the enact-
ment of the United States Constitution, the jury trial was the only right common in all twelve 
state Constitutions. Jonakait, supra note 60, at 21; Levy, supra note 59, at 85; Rights of the 
People: Individual Freedom and the Bill of Rights, U.S. Department of State Int’l Info. Pro-
gram, http://www.4uth.gov.ua/usa/english/society/rightsof/jury.htm (last visited May 16, 
2013) [hereinafter Rights of the People]. 
63 ABA Jury History, supra note 55, at 4. 
64 See Jonakait, supra note 60, at 107; Starr, supra note 58, at 18; Rights of the People, su-
pra note 62. 
65 Compare Judge Nancy Gertner & Judith H. Mizner, The Law of Juries 66 (6th 
ed. 2012) (noting that a party may exercise a for cause challenge against jurors who have 
connections to the case or the parties), with Jonakait, supra note 60, at 107 (noting that 
early jurors were chosen because of their knowledge of the parties or the dispute, and were 
asked to deliver a verdict on the basis of this knowledge alone). 
66 See Jonakait, supra note 60, at 261–62. Jonakait offers the illustrative example of 
watching a football game with friends who are cheering for opposing teams. Id. If there is a 
close call, say a receiver catches the ball very near the sideline, the friends will likely dis-
agree on whether or not the ball was caught in-bounds. Id. It is only natural to interpret 
the play in a way that will most benefit one’s team. Id. 
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 The American concept of a defendant’s right to a trial by jury is 
embodied in Article III of the United States Constitution, which pro-
vides that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; 
shall be by Jury . . . .”67 Silencing the Anti-Federalists who were not con-
vinced that the Constitution should be read to extend the right to a 
jury trial to all citizens, the Sixth and Seventh Amendments were rati-
fied in the Bill of Rights in 1791.68 The Sixth Amendment grants de-
fendants local trials by an impartial jury “in all criminal prosecutions,” 
while the Seventh Amendment assures the right to have juries in com-
mon-law civil cases.69 
B. The Impartiality Doctrine & the Cross-Sectional Requirement 
 The Sixth Amendment’s requirement of trials by an “impartial 
jury” aspires to ensure that a defendant will not be tried by a jury who 
harbors biases against him or her.70 Though the Constitution does not 
set forth any guidelines for impartiality, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted an “impartial” juror as one who is “indifferent” to the case at 
hand.71 For this reason, the parties are allowed to question potential 
                                                                                                                      
 
67 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 2–3; Levy, supra 
note 59, at 14–15. Many states have also provided the right for both criminal defendants 
and civil litigants to be tried by jury in their state Constitutions. Gertner & Mizner, supra 
note 65, at 2. 
68 See Levy, supra note 59, at 14–15; Starr, supra note 58, at 14–15; ABA Jury History, 
supra note 55, at 4. The Anti-Federalists argued that Article III’s jury provision was not 
specific enough to safeguard a defendant’s rights. Starr, supra note 58, at 14. They argued 
for jury trials to be conducted in the county where the crime was committed, rather than 
the state. Id. In addition, they did not believe that the right to a jury was conferred for civil 
cases. Id. at 14–15. 
69 U.S. Const. amends. VI–VII; Starr, supra note 58, at 15. The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Sixth Amendment to guarantee the right to a jury in all criminal cases, except those for 
“petty offenses.” District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624–25 (1937); Callan v. 
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 548–52 (1888). The Seventh Amendment provides “[i]n Suits at 
common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases extends to private torts, con-
tracts, and property cases where legal, rather than equitable, rights are at issue. Gertner & 
Mizner, supra note 65, at 6–7. 
70 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219–20 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Donna J. Meyer, A New Peremptory Inclusion to Increase Representa-
tiveness and Impartiality in Jury Selection, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 251, 259–60 (1994). 
71 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1961) (stating that the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees defendants the right to be tried by “a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors 
. . . . [whose] verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial”), superseded 
by statute as recognized in Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004); Gertner & Mizner, 
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jurors in a process known as voir dire in an attempt to reveal prejudices 
that might affect a juror’s ability to impartially consider the evidence 
and ultimately decide a defendant’s guilt or innocence.72 Parties are 
then given the opportunity to remove jurors using challenges, either 
with or without cause.73 
 Although the Sixth Amendment requires an impartial jury, not 
every member of the community was immediately allowed to serve on 
juries.74 Early in America’s history, most states only permitted jury ser-
vice by white men who owned property and paid taxes.75 By the late 
nineteenth century, jury qualifications were loosened in some states, 
but the issue was not fully addressed until after the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.76 
1. The Fourteenth Amendment 
 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees all citizens equal protec-
tion under the laws and has been used to make many of the rights guar-
anteed in the Bill of Rights applicable to the states.77 The Fourteenth 
Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; … nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”78 The Amendment guaranteed citizenship to 
                                                                                                                      
supra note 65, at 62; see Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—Rethinking Sixth Amendment 
Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 501, 544 (1986); Meyer, supra note 70, at 
259–60. An impartial juror does not have to be completely ignorant of the circumstances 
surrounding the case so long as they feel they can put their opinions aside and make a 
decision based on the evidence presented at trial. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722–23. 
72 Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 58–59; Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 67; 
David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and 
Empirical Analysis, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 3, 11–12 (2001); Meyer, supra note 70, at 263. 
73 Baldus et al., supra note 72, at 11–12; Meyer, supra note 70, at 264–65; see also infra 
notes 140–187 and accompanying text. 
74 See Jonakait, supra note 60, at 114; ABA Jury History, supra note 55, at 4. 
75 Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 36 n.8; Jonakait, supra note 60, at 114; ABA 
Jury History, supra note 55, at 4. The first African Americans to serve on a jury in the United 
States were Francis U. Clough and William H. Jenkins who served in 1860, in Worchester, 
Massachusetts. EJI Report, supra note 40, at 9; Long Road to Justice: The African American Ex-
perience in the Massachusetts Courts, Mass. Hist. Soc’y, http://www.masshist.org/longroad/ 
03participation/jury.htm# (last visited May 16, 2013). 
76 See Jonakait, supra note 60, at 115. 
77 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) (in-
corporating the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial to the states); Rachel Hartje, A Jury 
of Your Peers?: How Jury Consulting May Actually Help Trial Lawyers Resolve Constitutional Limi-
tations Imposed on the Selection of Juries, 41 Cal. W. L. Rev. 479, 487 (2005). 
78 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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recently emancipated African Americans and gave Congress the power 
to enforce these provisions against states that refused to provide all races 
equal protection of the laws.79 The Amendment has been interpreted by 
the Supreme Court to bestow various rights to both litigants and jurors, 
ensuring citizens of all races the right to serve on juries.80 
2. Strauder v. West Virginia: The Right to a Jury of One’s Peers 
 In 1897, the Supreme Court issued its first ruling on racial dis-
crimination in jury service.81 In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court held 
that West Virginia’s law banning African Americans from serving as ju-
rors was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.82 Strauder, an African American male, was 
convicted of murder by an all-white jury.83 Reversing Strauder’s convic-
tion, the Supreme Court held that West Virginia could not prohibit Af-
rican Americans from participating in jury service because the Four-
teenth Amendment declared that the laws in the United States must be 
applied equally without regard to race.84 
 The Strauder Court articulated the right to a jury of one’s peers, 
noting that the “very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the 
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned 
to determine . . . .”85 A defendant’s right to a jury by his “peers” does 
not mean he is tried by friends, but rather by people with whom he 
shares important characteristics.86 Commonalities such as race, gender, 
occupation, and socio-economic status ensure that jurors can empa-
                                                                                                                      
79 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306–07 (1879), abrogated on other grounds by, 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
80 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Hartje, supra note 77, at 488. 
81 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304, 310; Jonakait, supra note 60, at 115; Sean G. Overland, 
The Juror Factor: Race and Gender in America’s Civil Courts 85–86 (Melvin I. Urof-
sky ed., 2009). 
82 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304, 310; Jonakait, supra note 60, at 115; Overland, supra note 
81, at 85–86. The statute provided “[a]ll white male persons who are twenty-one years of 
age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors, except [state offi-
cials].” Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. 
83 Id. at 304–05. 
84 Id. at 308, 310; Debra L. Dippel, Holland v. Illinois: Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-Section Re-
quirement Does not Preclude Racially-Based Peremptory Challenges, 24 Akron L. Rev. 177, 179 
(1990). The Court in Strauder pronounced that African Americans have “the right to exemp-
tion from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored—exemption from legal 
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment 
of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them 
to the condition of a subject race.” Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307–08. 
85 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. 
86 Massaro, supra note 71, at 552; Meyer, supra note 70, at 261. 
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thize with the defendant and take into account common experiences 
that may be helpful in determining witness credibility, deciding guilt or 
innocence, and in making sentencing decisions.87 Clarifying its deci-
sion, the Court stated that a denial of equal protection would only be 
found where members of a defendant’s race were purposefully excluded 
from the panel of prospective jurors, often called the “jury venire.”88 
The Strauder Court specifically pronounced that it was not guaranteeing 
defendants the right to a petit jury comprised in whole or in part of 
members of his or her race.89 
 While holding that a state could not legally exclude a juror based 
on race, the Court recognized the state’s power to set “the qualifications 
of its jurors, and in so doing make discriminations.”90 The Court ac-
knowledged that requirements limiting jurors to men, freeholders, citi-
zens, persons within a specific age range, or those who met certain edu-
cational qualifications would not violate the Equal Protection Clause.91 
 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Strauder pro-
fessed to eliminate discriminatory intent in jury selection procedures, it 
was easily circumvented through the use of facially neutral eligibility re-
quirements.92 Southern states quickly realized that because voting re-
quirements were an issue of state law, they could keep African Ameri-
cans from sitting on juries by keeping them off voting lists.93 For 
example, education and property ownership were common, facially 
neutral voting requirements that were used to exclude African Ameri-
cans from juries.94 
 The Court has since elaborated and expanded the principles ar-
ticulated in Strauder.95 Over the next seventy years, the Supreme Court 
declared state laws unconstitutional when the effective result of a facially 
neutral eligibility requirement was a racially discriminatory jury selec-
tion process.96 Though the Court granted all races the equal right to 
                                                                                                                      
 
87 Massaro, supra note 71, at 552; Meyer, supra note 70, at 261–62. 
88 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305; Meyer, supra note 70, at 263; Jennifer Lee Urbanski, Geor-
gia v. McCollum: Protecting Jurors from Race-Based Peremptory Challenges but Forcing Criminal 
Defendants to Risk Biased Juries, 24 Pac. L. J. 1887, 1930 (1993). 
89 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. 
90 Id. at 305, 310. 
91 Id. at 310. 
92 See id.; Jonakait, supra note 60, at 115; Rights of the People, supra note 62. 
93 See Jonakait, supra note 60, at 115; Rights of the People, supra note 62. 
94 Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 Temp. L. 
Rev. 369, 382 (1992). 
95 Hartje, supra note 77, at 489. 
96 Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407–08 (1967) (striking down the use of juror lists 
based on segregated tax returns); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 548–49, 551–52 (1967) 
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serve on juries, it nevertheless refused to expand this right to mean that 
a defendant had a right to a jury that matched his or her own race.97 
3. The Jury Selection and Service Act: Fair Cross Section Requirement 
in Federal Courts 
 In an effort to afford all citizens an equal opportunity to serve on 
juries, Congress enacted the Jury Selection and Service Act ( JSSA) in 
1968.98 The Act declares that “all litigants in Federal courts entitled to 
trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at 
random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or 
division wherein the court convenes.”99 The Act prescribes specific pro-
cedures for randomly drawing the names of qualified citizens who are 
not excused or exempt from service.100 The JSSA mandates that voter 
registration lists be used as the primary source for compiling federal 
juror lists.101 
 The JSSA’s random selection procedures were enacted to put an 
end to the “blue ribbon juries,” which at that time were utilized by al-
most sixty percent of the federal courts.102 Under the “blue ribbon” 
system, the jury commissioner chose jurors who had an above average 
level of education or experience in the matter and thus were deemed 
“specially able” to decide the case.103 At that time, many thought that 
jurors should possess “above average levels of intelligence, morality, and 
integrity” in order to serve justice.104 
                                                                                                                      
(striking down the use of color-coded tax returns that designated taxpayer’s race to com-
pile juror lists); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 560, 562 (1953) (striking down the use of 
colored tickets to “randomly” select names for jury duty). 
97 See Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 282 (1909); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322–23 
(1879); Overland, supra note 81, at 87–88. 
98 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006); Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 53. 
99 § 1861. 
100 § 1866. The JSSA states that randomly selected citizens should be deemed qualified 
to serve on a jury if they are a U.S. citizen over the age of eighteen who has lived in the 
judicial district for at least one year and can speak and understand English. § 1865. A per-
son who meets the above qualifications, however, will not be allowed to serve if they have a 
mental or physical illness that would interfere with their ability to serve, or if they have 
been charged with or convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment of one year or 
more. Id. 
101 § 1863. 
102 See Abramson, supra note 58, at 99. 
103 Id.; Jonakait, supra note 60, at 123. 
104 Abramson, supra note 58, at 99. 
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4. Extension of the Cross-Sectional Obligation to State Courts in Taylor 
v. Louisiana 
 In the 1975 landmark decision Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme 
Court extended the cross-sectional obligation to state courts.105 Taylor, 
a male, appealed his conviction alleging that he was deprived of his 
right to be tried by a jury that was representative of the community be-
cause women were systematically excluded from the jury pool.106 The 
Supreme Court found that though Taylor was male, he had standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of Louisiana’s jury-selection procedure, 
which required women to file a declaration for inclusion in jury ser-
vice.107 Although women who wished to serve were included, the pro-
cedure had the effect of greatly reducing the number of women in the 
venire, thereby excluding from jury service an identifiable class of citi-
zens in the community.108 Declaring representative juries as “funda-
mental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,” the 
Court deemed the procedure unconstitutional.109 
 Acknowledging that states would need leeway in application of the 
cross-sectional mandate, the Court specified that states could fashion 
their own process for selection of the jury venire.110 The Court clarified 
that though juries must be chosen from a group that is “fairly represen-
tative” of the community, the jury empanelled in a case does not have 
to accurately depict the demographics of the community.111 Therefore, 
the Court held that it was constitutional for states to use reasonable ex-
emptions or challenges in the selection process.112 
                                                                                                                      
 
105 419 U.S. 522, 530, 538 (1975); Abramson, supra note 58, at 100. The State of Lou-
isiana required women to file a declaration stating their desire to be included in the jury 
venire. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 523–24. As a result, only ten percent of the eligible jury pool was 
comprised of women in a district where fifty-three percent of the residents were women 
otherwise qualified for service. Id. at 524. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 523, 526. In 1898, Utah was the first state to give women the right to sit on ju-
ries. Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 51. The right became more prominent after the 
enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 which gave women the right to vote 
because many states used voting rights as a requirement for jury service. See id. at 51–52. It 
was not until 1972 that women were allowed to sit on juries in all state and federal jurisdic-
tions. Id. at 52. Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina were the last states to grant 
women the right to sit on juries. Id. 
108 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525–26. 
109 Id. at 525, 530. 
110 Id. at 537–38. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 538.The Court elaborated that States can “grant exemptions from jury service 
to individuals in case of special hardship or incapacity and to those engaged in particular 
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II. Discrimination in Composition of the Jury Pool 
 Both the impartiality requirement in the Sixth Amendment and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provide 
protection against discriminatory jury selection procedures, albeit in 
slightly different ways.113 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids inten-
tional discrimination against protected groups, while the Sixth 
Amendment’s focus is not just on eradicating discrimination, but also 
on the broader goal of ensuring a body that is representative of the 
community.114 In addition, to claim an Equal Protection violation, the 
defendant is usually required to be part of the same group as the ex-
cluded juror.115 Conversely, a Sixth Amendment representativeness 
challenge can be claimed by any defendant, regardless of whether they 
are a member of the excluded juror’s group.116 
A. The Sixth Amendment’s Representativeness Requirement 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s mandate that jurors be selected from 
a pool that is fairly representative of the community, many groups are 
still underrepresented on jury venires.117 The Supreme Court formu-
lated a three-prong test for determining whether the fair-cross section 
requirement has been violated in choosing a jury venire.118 A petitioner 
must prove: (1) that the allegedly excluded group is a distinctive group 
in the community; (2) that this group’s representation in jury venires is 
not fair and reasonable in relation to its composition in the commu-
nity; and (3) that this group’s underrepresentation is due to the sys-
tematic exclusion of it in the jury selection process.119 According to the 
Supreme Court, a group with identifiable commonalities does not con-
stitute a distinctive group; rather, the group must share “some immuta-
                                                                                                                      
occupations the uninterrupted performance of which is critical to the community’s wel-
fare.” Id. at 534. 
113 Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 34–37. The overlapping protections might be 
due to the fact that the Sixth Amendment was not incorporated to the states until 1968, so 
early claims of state’s discriminatory procedures had to be brought under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 37 n.9. 
114 Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 35–37; Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 49. 
115 Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 34–35. 
116 Id. at 35. 
117 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 49, 
54–55; Jonakait, supra note 60, at 125. 
118 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359–60, 364 (1979) (reinforcing its decision in Tay-
lor v. Louisiana that the systematic exclusion of women from jury venires denies a defen-
dant his right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community). 
119 Id. at 364. 
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ble characteristic such as race, gender or ethnic background . . . .”120 
For example, African Americans, Mexican Americans, and women have 
all been recognized by the Supreme Court as distinctive groups.121 
Conversely, attempts to classify groups not sharing an immutable char-
acteristic, such as groups based on age, occupation or education level, 
as distinctive groups have failed.122 
 The cross-sectional requirement serves three important purposes: 
First, when the racial composition of the jury generally reflects that of 
the community, the jury’s verdict is likely to be viewed as a legitimate 
expression of the community.123 Second, broad community participa-
tion on juries educates the public on the mechanisms of the criminal 
justice system, and allows them to exercise some control over the proc-
ess, thereby increasing public confidence and respect for the govern-
ment.124 Third, a jury that is drawn from a fair cross-section of the 
community protects defendants’ rights because when jurors that span 
racial, gender, and class lines are brought together, the result is a “dif-
fused impartiality.”125 The emphasis on diffused impartiality is a recog-
nition that “in a heterogeneous society, no person[] is truly impartial, 
unbiased, or unprejudiced.”126 Therefore, the focus is shifted from the 
                                                                                                                      
120 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986); Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, 
at 38; Meiring de Villiers, The Impartiality Doctrine: Constitutional Meaning and Judicial Impact, 
34 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 71, 76–77 (2010). 
121 Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 (recognizing women as a distinctive group); Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (recognizing Mexican Americans as a distinctive group); 
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 505 (1972) (recognizing African Americans as a distinctive 
group); United States v. Cannady, 54 F.3d 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing Asian 
Americans as a “distinctive group”); de Villiers, supra note 120, at 77. 
122 United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d 781, 782 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that “college 
students” are not a distinctive group); Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 6–8 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(noting that neither “blue collar workers” nor “less educated individuals” are a distinctive 
group); Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999–1000 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that young adults 
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four are not a distinctive group because there is no 
“common characteristic”); see also Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 37, 38 & n.8 (dis-
cussing groups that have been recognized by the Supreme Court as “distinctive” for Sixth 
Amendment purposes). 
123 Hiroshi Fukurai & Richard Krooth, Race in the Jury Box: Affirmative Ac-
tion in Jury Selection 133 (Austin T. Turk ed., 2003) (noting that jury diversity should 
be valued because if all of the jurors, regardless of how varied the viewpoints are to begin 
with, can come to an agreement, it increases the verdict’s legitimacy). 
124 See Fukurai & Krooth, supra note 123, at 131, 133; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) (noting that “state-sanctioned discrimination in the court-
room” diminishes the public’s confidence in the justice system). 
125 Abramson, supra note 58, at 101; Fukurai & Krooth, supra note 123, at 133; 
Meyer, supra note 70, at 260. 
126 Fukurai & Krooth, supra note 123, at 129; Meyer, supra note 70, at 260. 
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impartiality of any one juror to that of the jury as a whole.127 A diverse 
jury is more likely to be impartial because the biases of any one mem-
ber are balanced against those of the rest of the group.128 
B. State Qualifications, Exemptions, and Excusals from Jury Service 
 States are free to prescribe the qualifications for their jurors.129 
Most states require that prospective jurors be United States citizens, be 
over 18 years of age, have no previous felony convictions, and can un-
derstand English.130 Some states, such as Texas, mandate that jurors be 
“of sound mind and good moral character,” a requirement that has his-
torically been used to impermissibly exclude otherwise qualified citi-
zens.131 
 In addition to minimum qualifications for jury service that limit 
the jury pool, many state legislatures provide outright exemptions or 
excusals to certain groups of citizens.132 Exemptions and excusals serve 
the same broad purpose, but exemptions are typically automatic dis-
missals from jury service, whereas excusals are granted on a case-by-case 
basis.133 The granting of either an exemption or an excusal recognizes 
that jury service would pose a hardship on the prospective juror.134 
 The spectrum of state-created exemptions is vast, but the trend is 
towards eliminating outright exemptions—especially those based on 
occupation, which have long served to undermine diversity on juries— 
and instead focusing on excusals that must be approved by the court.135 
At one extreme of the spectrum are states such as Massachusetts that 
do not grant any automatic exemptions; at the other extreme are states 
such as Hawaii, which grants numerous automatic occupational exemp-
                                                                                                                      
127 Fukurai & Krooth, supra note 123, at 128–29; see Meyer, supra note 70, at 260. 
128 Abramson, supra note 58, at 101; Fukurai & Krooth, supra note 123, at 128; 
Meyer, supra note 70, at 260. 
129 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. 
130 Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 54; EJI Report, supra note 40, at 37; Gregory E. 
Mize et al., The State-of-the-States Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts: A Com-
pendium Report 21 (2007), http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/cjs/pdf/SOSCom- 
pendiumFinal.pdf [hereinafter State-of-the-States Survey]. Qualifications for jury 
service are easily met by the majority of citizens. Overland, supra note 81, at 2. 
131 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 62.102(4) (West 2005); EJI Report, supra note 40, at 10. 
132 Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 54. 
133 Anne Skove, Jury Management: Exemptions from Jury Duty, Nat’l Center for State 
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htm (last visited May 16, 2013). 
134 See EJI Report, supra note 40, at 37. 
135 See id. at 14; State-of-the-States Survey, supra note 130, at 15; Pamela J. Wood, 
Massachusetts’ Leadership Role in the American Jury System, 55 Bos. B.J. 13, 15 (2011). 
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tions.136 Most states fall somewhere in the middle with few or no out-
right exemptions, but give local courts to excuse jurors on an individual 
basis.137 Excusals are only granted where jury service would pose undue 
hardship or extreme inconvenience.138 For example, excusals are 
commonly granted for jurors who are in financial straits and cannot 
afford to miss a day of work, mothers who are nursing young children, 
and jurors who live a great distance from the courthouse.139 
III. Discrimination in Petit Jury Selection: The  
Peremptory Challenge 
 Once the jury venire is established, potential jurors are questioned, 
either by the judge or counsel, during a voir dire examination.140 If the 
judge feels that any of the potential jurors harbors biases against either 
party or has knowledge of the facts of the case that might cloud the ju-
ror’s judgment, the juror may be dismissed for cause.141 Challenges for 
cause are unlimited in number and are used only when the juror does 
not meet the qualifications for service or where there is an articulable 
reason to doubt the juror’s impartiality.142 Commonly recognized chal-
lenges for cause are: disabilities that would interfere with the potential 
juror’s ability to serve; connections to the case or the parities; biases 
against a party on account of race, religion, or other status; and objec-
tions to issues presented by the case such as the death penalty or insanity 
defense.143 
                                                                                                                      
136 Compare Haw. Rev. Stat. § 612-6 (2010) (exempting the following occupations 
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140 Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 67. 
141 Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 66–68; Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 67. 
In Canada, it is assumed that jurors will take the oath, set aside any preconceived notions 
or biases and decide a case exclusively on the evidence presented at trial. Hans & Vidmar, 
supra note 54, at 63. In the United States, however, prospective jurors are questioned at 
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juryper.html (last visited May 16, 2013). 
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 Conversely, a peremptory challenge gives litigants the ability to 
remove potential jurors from the panel without providing an explana-
tion.144 Peremptory challenges date back to Roman times, and have 
always existed in the United States.145 Although the Constitution does 
not explicitly provide for peremptory challenges, the Supreme Court 
has recognized their importance in achieving an impartial jury under 
the Sixth Amendment.146 
A. Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges 
 Peremptory challenges are limited in number and give parties the 
flexibility to remove jurors who they believe are biased when there is 
not enough evidence to remove them for cause.147 The number of per-
emptory challenges each side is entitled to exercise varies with the ju-
risdiction and type of case being tried, but they exist for all trials, both 
civil and criminal.148 Peremptory challenges are said to preserve fair-
ness and assure litigants that the verdict will be based solely on the evi-
dence placed before them at trial.149 In 1986, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the use of discriminatory peremptory challenges in Batson v. 
Kentucky.150 
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1. Proving an Equal Protection Violation: The Batson Challenge 
 In Batson, an African American man appealed his conviction in the 
State of Kentucky, claiming that the prosecutor’s discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges denied him equal protection of the laws.151 The 
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to excuse the only four African 
American jurors, thus leaving an all white jury.152 The Supreme Court, 
reaffirming the proposition that racially based peremptory challenges 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, established a framework for prov-
ing purposeful discrimination.153 As with all Equal Protection claims, 
the defendant carries the burden of proving a Batson violation.154 
There are three components to a Batson challenge.155 
 First, the defendant must prove a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion in the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges.156 This includes 
proving that the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group 
and that there is a pattern of excluding members of this racial group 
through the use of peremptory challenges.157 Expressing a necessity for 
future courts to consider all relevant circumstances that may guide the 
inquiry, the Supreme Court stated that a prosecutor’s questioning dur-
ing voir dire may give rise to an inference of discrimination.158 
 After the defendant has proven a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral expla-
nation for the dismissals.159 Providing guidance for future courts, the 
Supreme Court noted that this justification does not need to rise to the 
level of a challenge for cause, but a prosecutor cannot merely state that 
he believed the excused juror would be partial to the defendant be-
cause the juror and the defendant are of the same race.160 In this sec-
ond step, courts should not assess the persuasiveness or plausibility of 
the proffered explanation.161 It is in the third step of the Batson analysis 
that the judge must determine whether to find purposeful discrimina-
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tion or accept the race neutral reason for the dismissal, thereby reject-
ing the Batson challenge.162 
2. Extension of Batson 
 The Batson framework has been extended and clarified multiple 
times since the Supreme Court’s decision more than twenty-five years 
ago.163 In 1991, just six years after Batson was decided, the Supreme 
Court decided two cases in which it extended the prohibition on ra-
cially based peremptory challenges.164 First, in Powers v. Ohio, the Court 
considered whether Powers, a white male, had standing to object to the 
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to dismiss seven African 
American potential jurors.165 Affirming the notion that every defen-
dant has a Constitutional right to be tried by a jury whose members are 
selected using nondiscriminatory criteria, the Court held that any de-
fendant, regardless of his or her race, may make a Batson objection.166 
In the second case that year, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, the 
Supreme Court extended the Batson framework to peremptory chal-
lenges exercised in civil trials.167 
 Just one year later, the Supreme Court again took up the issue of 
race-based peremptory challenges.168 In Georgia v. McCollum, Caucasian 
defendants were charged with assaulting an African American cou-
ple.169 After counsel for the defense admitted that he planned to use 
peremptory challenges to remove all African American prospective ju-
rors from the panel, the prosecution objected, citing Batson.170 The Su-
preme Court found that the Constitution prohibited such racial dis-
crimination, thereby extending the Batson framework to strikes made 
by criminal defendants.171 
 In 1994, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., the Supreme Court’s most 
recent extension of the Batson framework, the Court considered 
whether gender-based peremptory challenges could be contested under 
                                                                                                                      
162 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. 
163 Overland, supra note 81, at 92–94. 
164 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 
U.S. 400, 402–03 (1991). 
165 Powers, 499 U.S. at 402–04. 
166 Id. at 404, 415–16. 
167 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 631. 
168 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 44–45. 
171 Id. at 45–46, 59. 
2013] Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection Procedures 475 
Batson.172 Petitioner, the alleged father in a paternity suit, challenged 
the State’s use of nine of its ten peremptory challenges to dismiss men, 
resulting in an all female jury.173 The Court found gender-based dis-
missals violate the Equal Protection Clause and only “serv[ed] to ratify 
and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the 
relative abilities of men and women.”174 Stating that gender is a category 
which is subject to heightened scrutiny, the Court held that peremptory 
challenges can be used only to strike jurors based on classifications that 
would survive rational basis review.175 For example, strikes can be used 
to dismiss prospective jurors based on occupation, but they can never be 
used to strike prospective jurors based on gender or race.176 
3. Batson in Action 
 In an attempt to preserve the historical use of peremptory chal-
lenges as an unexplained dismissal of potential jurors, courts have con-
tinually extended the acceptable range of race-neutral explanations.177 
Commonly accepted race-neutral explanations are the juror’s age, 
marital status, occupation, socio-economic status, demeanor, education, 
religion, and prior experience with the criminal justice system.178 The 
Supreme Court has upheld the right to exercise a peremptory chal-
lenge on the basis of a “silly or superstitious” theory, accepting as race-
neutral the dismissal of an African American juror due to his “long, 
unkempt hair, a mustache and a beard.”179 Furthermore, excluding a 
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173 Id. at 129. Of the original thirty-six member juror panel, twelve were males and 
twenty-four were female. Id. Three jurors, two of which were male, were dismissed by the 
court for cause, leaving only ten prospective male jurors. Id. The State then dismissed nine 
of the male jurors using peremptory challenges and plaintiff dismissed one. Id. 
174 Id. at 130–31. 
175 Id. at 143, 146; Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 129–30. 
176 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143, 146; Gertner & Mizner, supra note 65, at 129–30. 
177 See Overland, supra note 81, at 96–97. 
178 Overland, supra note 81, at 97. 
179 Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768–69; id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Overland, supra 
note 81, at 97–100. The prosecutor’s accepted “race-neutral” reason in Purkett v. Elem now 
serves as an infamous example highlighting the deficiencies in the Batson framework. 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768–69; Overland, supra note 81, at 97–100. The full explanation prof-
fered was: 
I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his long hair. He had long curly 
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potential juror because he or she is bilingual has been found accept-
able by the Supreme Court.180 If non-English speaking witnesses are 
expected to testify and the lawyer believes a potential juror may substi-
tute their own translation for that of the interpreter, the challenge is 
not considered one that is prohibited as racially based.181 This decision 
essentially allows lawyers to frame their prohibited race based chal-
lenges as permissible language based challenges.182 
 Additionally, while the Supreme Court in Batson cited two possible 
remedies for a Batson violation, it failed to endorse either of them as 
preferable.183 One of these remedies requires replacing the entire jury 
venire with new prospective jurors and repeating the exercise of dis-
missal using peremptory challenges.184 Critics argue that the use of this 
remedy might give lawyers an incentive to discriminate based on race in 
the hopes that the jury venire will be replaced with prospective jurors 
who are more favorable to their case.185 The second suggested remedy, 
reinstatement of the struck juror, is also problematic because the rein-
stated juror might have difficulty being impartial after his or her dis-
criminatory dismissal.186 Because the Supreme Court did not articulate 
the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation, lower courts have fash-
ioned their own remedies, which in turn has produced inconsistencies 
among the States.187 
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B. Defendants’ Right to an Impartial Jury vs. Jurors’ Rights to Be Free from 
Discrimination 
 In the peremptory challenge context, there is a considerable 
amount of tension between the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to an 
impartial jury comprised of a cross-section of the defendant’s commu-
nity, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of discrimina-
tion.188 The Sixth Amendment’s impartiality doctrine seeks to compile 
a diverse jury that, in the aggregate, is free of biases or prejudices that 
may affect its ability to impartially consider the evidence.189 The doc-
trine is premised on the assumption that each potential juror has views 
and interests based on his or her race, gender, religion, and ethnic 
background that subconsciously affect his or her perspective in a given 
case.190 Therefore, the impartiality doctrine holds that it is necessary 
that the parties have the ability to strike jurors that they believe might 
harbor biases or are otherwise unable to consider evidence impar-
tially.191 
 In contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
necessitates colorblindness in the selection of jurors.192 The Supreme 
Court has rejected the argument that commonalities between jurors 
and defendants such as race and gender are indicative of bias, and has 
found instead that demographics do not necessarily shape a juror’s 
views.193 Emphasizing the necessity of colorblindness in the courtroom 
during jury selection, the Court stated: 
if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel 
as fair, we reaffirm today that such a price is too high to meet 
the standard of the Constitution. Defense counsel is limited to 
legitimate, lawful conduct. It is an affront to justice to argue 
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that a fair trial includes the right to discriminate against a 
group of citizens based upon their race.194 
Thus, the Court has firmly stated that race cannot be used as a proxy for 
determining juror bias; however, despite this mandate, peremptory chal-
lenges continue to be used seemingly on race alone, and the current 
construction of the Batson challenge does little to curb this use.195 The 
peremptory challenge procedure as a whole is at odds with the notion 
that a jury should be comprised of a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity.196 Attorneys do not seek a fair and impartial jury; in fact, they seek 
the exact opposite—a jury that is favorable to their position.197 Peremp-
tory challenges are premised on the theory that they are necessary to 
ensure that those with biases will not be impaneled; but in reality, they 
allow attorneys to dismiss jurors based on arbitrary characteristics such 
race, gender, age, occupation, education, and socio-economic status.198 
IV. Improving Representativeness on Juries 
 Although the jury system is deeply embedded in America’s legal 
system, its fairness is frequently questioned.199 The jury system is said to 
create unnecessary delays in litigation, impose unfair social costs on 
jurors, and be overly expensive for courts and litigants alike.200 It is also 
criticized because it leaves a defendant’s fate in the hands of a ran-
domly chosen group of citizens with no special legal training.201 Critics 
of the jury system discredit jurors’ capability to understand the com-
plexities of the justice system, stating that juries are “at best, twelve 
people of average ignorance.”202 This group of average citizens then 
deliberates in secret and presents its verdict with no explanation what-
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soever.203 Furthermore, jury verdicts are difficult to overturn because 
the jury’s role is to determine the facts.204 
 Abandonment of the current jury system, however, is unlikely be-
cause it is deeply ingrained in America’s history, character, and Consti-
tutional underpinnings.205 Juries make decisions based primarily upon 
their own sense of values and equities and therefore the “jury verdict is 
more than a statement of fact; it is also an expression of the popular 
will.”206 Diverse juries inject a sense of fairness into the judicial process 
and therefore bolster confidence in the system as a whole.207 
 Conversely, racially disproportionate juries reinforce the percep-
tion that our justice system is unfair to minorities.208  Great strides have 
been taken to make juries more representative of the community, but 
there is still work to be done.209 In order to adequately protect both the 
right of defendants to be tried by a jury representative of a cross-section 
of the community and the right of citizens to participate in the legal 
system, representativeness should be improved at each of the three lev-
els at which juror exclusion takes place: (1) the initial drawing of the 
jury pool, (2) exemptions and excusals from jury service, and (3) and 
the use of peremptory challenges when empanelling the petit jury.210 
States should follow Massachusetts’ lead in increasing diversity and rep-
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resentativeness, for example by enacting an annual municipal census, 
increasing the daily rate paid to jurors, and adopting the one day or 
one trial approach.211 Furthermore, it is time for the Supreme Court to 
reevaluate the use of peremptory challenges and the Batson framework 
to eradicate discrimination in the jury selection process.212 
A. Increasing Representativeness of the Jury Venire 
 Although many states and municipalities randomly select potential 
jurors from voter registration records, cognizable groups within the 
community often are excluded.213 Many groups are underrepresented 
due to the way jury venires are compiled because the disqualifying char-
acteristics have a higher probability of exempting them from service.214 
For example, minorities, young people, those who move residences of-
ten, and those who are less affluent are typically less likely to be regis-
tered voters.215 In order to improve representativeness at the initial 
drawing of the jury venire, states and local municipalities should be re-
quired to draw from official records that represent a broader range of 
citizens, not just those who are registered to vote.216 
 Indeed, in an attempt to combat the lack of minority representa-
tion on jury venires, many states and municipal government agencies 
have started using other means to supplement the voter registration re-
cords.217 These sources include drivers’ license records, lists of state is-
sued identification cards, welfare rolls, state unemployment recipients, 
and even telephone books or city directories.218 Others municipalities 
are considering measures such as allowing defendants to request the 
more diverse “city-only” jury instead of one composed of members from 
the larger community, which typically include more affluent suburbs.219 
One courthouse in the Detroit area even went as far as subtracting ran-
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domly selected non-minorities from the jury venire in an effort to con-
struct a jury pool that mirrored the demographics of the community.220 
Six years later, however, that practice was struck down by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for unconstitutionally discriminating 
against nonminority jurors.221 
 Massachusetts has been particularly successful in compiling com-
prehensive, up-to-date lists.222 It is unique in that it sends out a statuto-
rily-mandated yearly census that is used to create the master juror list 
from which jurors are randomly summonsed.223 As a result, Massachu-
setts has one of the highest “juror yield” rates—the percentage of 
summoned potential jurors that show up at the courthouse—in the 
country.224 Other states should follow Massachusetts’s lead and enact a 
yearly census from which they can compile an accurate and up-to-date 
juror list.225 Though there is a cost associated with collecting census 
data, it is largely offset by the time saved in compiling a juror list from 
multiple sources, and the reduction in expenses incurred for printing, 
mailing, and processing undeliverable summonses.226 
B. Increasing Representativeness Through Elimination of Exceptions 
 Exemptions and excusals further destroy jury representative-
ness.227 For example, occupational exemptions, which were once very 
common, grant automatic exemptions to persons in specific fields.228 
Thus, these exemptions eliminate large sections of the population 
based on generalizations that these citizens are so indispensible in their 
fields that they cannot miss time to serve on a jury.229 All citizens 
                                                                                                                      
220 United States. v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir. 1998); Higgins, supra note 
208, at 51. 
221 Ovalle, 136 F.3d at 1100; Higgins, supra note 208, at 51. 
222 See Wood, supra note 135, at 13–14. Massachusetts’s success in compiling an up-to-
date juror list is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts obtained permission to use the State’s annually-updated list, as opposed to the 
more limited voter registration lists utilized by federal courts, for its random selection of 
jurors. Id. 
223 Id. at 14; see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 51, § 4 (2011) (requiring the registrars of 
each city and town to compile a list of each person residing there above the age of three). 
224 Wood, supra  note 135, at 14. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
227 See EJI Report, supra note 40, at 37; Hans & Vidmar, supra note 54, at 54; see also 
supra notes 128–139 and accompanying text. 
228 See Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament of Professional Ju-
rors, 25 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 239, 246 (2007). 
229 See id. 
482 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33:453 
should have an obligation to serve on juries and no one class should be 
seen as too important or too busy to serve.230 Occupational exemptions 
should be completely abolished and instead excusals should be made 
on a case-by-case basis only when it can be shown that jury service 
would be a burden.231 
 Hardship excusals can also dramatically affect the representative-
ness of a jury pool.232 Excusals based on hardship are given to those who 
care full-time for another—such as small children or the elderly—or 
those for whom missing time at work to serve on a jury would cause se-
vere financial hardship.233 Granting excusals based on financial hard-
ship disproportionally excludes those of a lower socioeconomic status.234 
 In addition, requests for hardship excusals are not equally distrib-
uted across demographic lines in extended trials.235 In a trial lasting a 
few weeks or more, financial-hardship excuses are routinely granted to 
the self-employed or other workers whose employers will not compen-
sate them for time spent away from work performing jury service.236 
Consequently, white males who tend to be privately employed are dis-
proportionally excused from service in prolonged trials.237 Jurors on 
prolonged trials are therefore “more likely to be unemployed or retired, 
female, without a college education, and unmarried than are jurors who 
serve on shorter trials.”238 Thus, the burden of serving on an extended 
trial is unfairly placed on those who are of a lower socio-economic 
status.239 
 Some states and local governments are instituting a “one day, one 
trial” policy that works to reduce hardships that typically exempt minor-
ity jurors from service.240 Under the “one day, one trial” system, jurors 
are only required to serve for one day or, if impaneled, for the length 
of one trial.241 In fact, in Massachusetts, which utilizes the system, ap-
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proximately ninety percent of those who report for service are done in 
one day, and ninety-five percent finish in three days or less.242 This rela-
tively short commitment lessens the burden on each person called for 
jury duty and significantly reduces the need for exemptions or excusals 
from jury service.243 
 Further alleviating the burden of service, the Massachusetts system 
allows summonsed jurors to reschedule their service to a date of their 
choosing so long as service is completed within a year from the date on 
which they were originally scheduled to appear.244 Jurors who complete 
their service are disqualified from serving for a period of three years as 
an attempt to spread the burden of service equally among the commu-
nity.245 In an effort to relieve some of the financial burden of missing 
work, even if only for a few days, Massachusetts requires that employers 
pay for the first three days of jury service, after which the state pays a 
per diem rate of fifty dollars per day.246 
 States should emulate the approach used in Massachusetts, where 
comprehensive juror lists are created using a statutorily-mandated cen-
sus, nearly everyone is considered eligible to serve, and the number of 
hardship claims is reduced because of the ability to select a service date, 
short service periods, and increased juror compensation rate.247 These 
features make Massachusetts’s system an admirable one that “pro-
duce[s] jury pools that are diverse and representative, the cornerstone 
of ‘a jury of one’s peers.’”248 
C. Increasing Representativeness by Limiting or Abolishing  
Peremptory Challenges 
 Supreme Court rulings that prohibit discrimination against pro-
tected groups in the initial jury venire are ineffective in part because of 
the great discretion afforded in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges.249 Some describe the Supreme Court’s Batson line of cases as al-
lowing the Court to “have its cake and eat it, too.”250 The decisions allow 
the Court to appear as if it is enumerating procedures to end invidious 
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discrimination, while at the same time not interfering with the day-to-
day use of the peremptory challenge.251 
  Just as Justice Marshall predicted in his concurring opinion in Bat-
son v. Kentucky, the Batson framework has proved ineffective in abolish-
ing discriminatory uses of the peremptory challenge.252 A Batson viola-
tion is difficult to prove; thus, challenges are rarely successful.253 One 
study showed that only seventeen percent of Batson challenges were 
successful, and that successful challenges were usually the result of an 
attorney admitting discriminatory intent or offering no explanation at 
all.254 Surprisingly however, Batson challenges are successful fifty-three 
percent of the time when an attorney claims discrimination based on 
the complete removal of white jurors.255 In fact, in Tennessee and 
North Carolina, there has never been a successful reversal based on 
Batson.256 
 This lack of success in Batson challenges is due in large part to the 
fact that courts generally accept the race-neutral reasons offered by at-
torneys, even when the attorney admits that race was one factor in seek-
ing dismissal.257 Justice Marshall highlighted the dilemma that trial 
judges face when they have to enforce an ethical rule that frequently 
requires them to accuse lawyers of lying when they offer race-neutral 
reasons for peremptory challenges.258 Because courts frequently accept 
almost any race neutral explanation, a prosecutor can easily conceal 
discriminatory intent.259 
 The Supreme Court must reevaluate the use of peremptory chal-
lenges, and at a minimum, should adhere to the framework it espoused 
in the Batson decision.260 In Batson, the Court stated that once a party 
makes out a case for purposeful discrimination at step one, the burden 
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shifts to the proponent of the strike who “must give a ‘clear and rea-
sonably specific’ explanation” for the challenge that is “related to the 
particular case to be tried.”261 Since the Batson decision the Court has 
significantly altered the test, and now allows “any neutral explanation, 
no matter how ‘implausible or fantastic,’ even if it is ‘silly or supersti-
tious.’”262 In fact, the Court currently permits any explanation so long 
as it is race-neutral—that is, it does not mention race—to satisfy the 
burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenge.263 
This construction allows attorneys to use strikes premised on stereo-
types, such as occupation, insufficient community ties, or socioeco-
nomic status, which do not mention race but have a disproportionate 
effect of eliminating those of a certain racial group.264 Instead, the 
Court should return to the essence of the Batson decision and require 
the explanation as to why they believe the stricken jurors exhibited 
bias.265 Although this may seem at odds with the use of the peremptory 
challenge as an “unexplained excusal” it is appropriate to require a 
heightened explanation after a prima facie case for discrimination has 
been made.266 Unless something is done to rein in the use of peremp-
tory challenges, efforts to improve representativeness at other levels of 
the jury selection process can easily be thwarted.267 
Conclusion 
 Society should not tolerate discrimination in a justice system that 
claims equal protection for all. Although the jury system is not perfect, 
it should be preserved because it epitomizes America’s democratic val-
ues. The jury allows ordinary citizens to ensure that the government 
abides by the spirit of the law, and not just the letter of the law. Stereo-
types should not be used to strip certain groups of their right to par-
ticipate on a jury. The notion of being tried by one’s peers is largely 
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illusory, as groups of citizens are excluded from jury service at all three 
stages of the jury selection process. Therefore, improvements should be 
made to increase jury representativeness at the initial drawing of the 
jury pool, statutory exemptions and excusals, and in the use of per-
emptory challenges when empanelling the petit jury. The jury should 
be preserved as an institution because “twelve persons of diverse back-
grounds are capable of achieving a wisdom together that no one per-
son is capable of achieving alone.”268 All Americans—regardless of their 
race, gender, age, occupation, or socioeconomic status—should be al-
lowed to participate in this democratic pursuit of wisdom. 
 
268 Abramson, supra note 58, at 140. 
